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OVERLAPPING DISTRICTS VERSUS MUNICIPAL
AUTHORITIES IN THE AREA OF
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
Walter A. Rafalko*
We cannot assume that the legislature will disobey the organic
law of the state, or will ever attempt to create other corporations
within existing incorporated towns or cities, for the redistribution
of the powers or functions of such municipalities, in order to evade
the restriction in respect to the debt limit in our constitution.
JoiwAN, J., in Campbell v.
City of Indianapolis, 155
Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920, 929(1900).
INTRODUCTION
The author of the above quote was not being very realistic on this
subject and, as a matter of fact, the creation of devices by the legis-
lature to subvert the organic law is more frequently employed by
sanctioning evasion of the law than by enforcing the constitutional
prohibition against the municipality. The application of the constitu-
tional and statutory limitations which have been placed on the
powers of municipalities to contract debts generally has created much
confusion, chaos and conflict of decisions by the courts.' Today, the
constitutions and statutes of every state have put a ceiling upon the
total debt which a municipality may lawfully incur.' Any obligation
beyond this limit is generally considered null and void, leaving the
contractor who has supplied goods and services without any method
of recovery.' Evasion of the provisions has taken several forms, such
as: creating overlapping districts as separate taxing entities, courts
interpreting obligations as involuntary or ex delicto, rather than
voluntary or ex contractu, incurring of obligations to be met by spe-
cial assessment, the special fund or self-liquidating project, long-term
* B.S., St. Louis University; LL.B., Boston University; LL.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity; J.D., John Marshall University. Member of the Missouri, District of Columbia,
Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court Bars. Professor of Law, Duquesne
University.
1 Note, Power of Municipality to Exceed Debt Limit, 40 COLUM. L. Rv. 70
(194).
2 Bowers, Jr., Limitations on Municipal Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L. REv. 37 (1951).
8 Snyder, Computing Municipal Indebtedness under Pennsylvania Constitutional
Limitations, 7 U. PiTT. L. REv. 198 (1941).
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contracts for services or the conditional sales contract device, issu-
ance of tax anticipation notes, long-term leases by a city, to be
financed by an annual rental .to cover the bonded indebtedness, and
the issuance of funding or refunding bonds by a municipality. 4 This
article will investigate two of the forms used to defeat the purposes
of the statutory and constitutional limitations on the amount of
municipal indebtedness-the overlapping district and the municipal
authority. The salient fact which distinguishes the authority from the
overlapping district is that the authority, which has also been given
statutory power to issue its own bonds, also looks to the municipal
corporation for annual payments primarily and these payments are
designated as rental payments. The municipality enters into a long-
term contract with the authority to make these payments, which are
to be financed out of the municipality's receipts.5
Public corporations are usually divided into two classes, municipal
corporations and public quasi-corporations. The municipal corpora-
tion is a subdivision of a state endowed with governmental powers
and charged with local governmental functions and responsibilities.
It includes cities, boroughs, villages and towns (except New England
towns). The class of public quasi-corporations has been defined to
include all bodies politic and corporate created for the sole purpose
of performing one or more municipal functions. 6 This class of public
quasi-corporations includes all public corporations organized for
governmental purposes and having for most purposes the status and
power of municipal corporations (such as counties, townships, New
4 Bowers, Jr., supra note 2, at 44. See generally FORDHAM, LOCAl. GOVERNMENT
LAW 548 (1949); 15 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 41.01041.44 (3d
ed., Smith, 1950) 1 STASON AND KAUPER, CASES ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 518
(3d ed. 1959); Durisch, Publicly Owned Utilities and the Problem of Municipal Debt
Limits, 31 MICH. L. REV. 503 (1933); Hoyt and Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions
upon Public Debt in North Carolina, 16 N.C.L. REv. 329 (1938); Lovett, Legal
Development of the Borrowing Power of Kentucky Municipalities, 31 Ky. L.J. 55
(1942); Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around
Debt Limitations, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 377 (1957); Snyder, Computing Municipal
Indebtedness under Pennsylvania Constitutional Limitations, 7 U. PITT. L. REv. 198
(1941) ; Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness, 30 MICH.
L. REv. 833 (1932); Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 177 (1937); Comments, 53 MICH.
L. REV. 439 (1955), 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1016 (1950); Legislation, 18 IOWA L. REv.
269 (1933); Notes, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 962 (1950), 14 CoLum. L. REV. 70 (1914),
44 HARv. L. REV. 610 (1931), 25 IND. L.J. 325 (1950), 6 IND. L.J. 191 (1930),
17 KY. I.J. 304 (1929), 34 MINN. L. REV. 360 (1950), 17 NOTRE DAmE LAW, 46
(1941), 6 OHIO ST. L.J. 297 (1940), 3 Wis. L. REv. 352 (1925).
5 STASON AND KAUPER, CASES ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 525 n.6 (3d ed.
1959).
6 Woodward v. Livermore Falls Water Dist., 116 Me. 86, 100 Ad. 317 (1917).
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England towns, authorities, school districts, drainage districts, sani-
tary districts, irrigation districts, etc., but not municipal corporations
proper, such as cities and incorporated towns).7 The characteristics
of public quasi-corporations are: the population is less dense, the
corporate powers are more limited, the functions are highly special-
ized, and they are primarily subdivisions of the state to carry out
state functions. 8 Thus, both the overlapping district and municipal
authority qualify as public quasi-corporations.
How do they differ from each other? In Pennsylvania, municipal
authorities came into existence as a, form of a municipal corporation
with the passage of the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, or
with a specific function it was to perform, such as under the "Urban
Redevelopment Law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."'" Mu-
nicipal authorities are not like overlapping districts since they have
no power to tax and are not responsible directly to the electorate.
Neither did the authorities have a general police power conferred
upon them as was conferred upon municipal corporations. Municipal
authorities are corporate bodies organized to perform a specialized
service." Once the authority is established under the general enabling
statute, a Board is created consisting of not less than five members
appointed by the governing body of the state, county or municipality
establishing the authority for terms of five years. The Board of the
authority is then free to organize its affairs to carry out the purposes
for which it was created by being authorized (a) to borrow money by
issuing bonds, (b) to exercise the right of eminent domain, (c) to
appoint officers, agents and employees, (d) to charge rates for its
facilities, (e) to contract for buildings, supplies and equipment, and
(f) to do all acts and things necessary or convenient for the promo-
tion of its business and the general welfare of the authority. 12
On the other hand, in Pennsylvania overlapping districts, e.g.,
school and institutional districts, have very broad governing powers
as compared to municipal authorities, but less than municipalities.
The school districts are governed by "Boards of Public Education."
The Board of School Directors is the exclusive governing body in
school districts, with authority to tax, borrow, condemn property by
7 See Snider v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N.W. 763 (1892).
8 STASoN AND KAUPER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1.
9 Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 301-322 (1957).
10 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1701-1719 (1964).
11 HANcoCK, PENNSYLVAN A LocAL GOVERNMENT, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, p. 61
(1957).
12 Id. at 62.
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eminent domain and engage in all activities necessary to sustain the
educational program throughout the state.13 School districts are classi-
fied into five classes on the basis of population according to a legisla-
tive formula: 14 First Class (Philadelphia) -population of 1,500,000
or more; First Class A (Pittsburgh) -population between 500,000
and 1,500,000; Second Class-population between 30,000 and
500,000; Third Class-population between 5,000 and 30,000; Fourth
Class-population of less than 5,000.
In First Class and First Class A Districts (Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh), the boards consist of a membership of fifteen Directors ap-
pointed for terms of six years by the Courts of Common Pleas of their
respective counties. All of the other districts elect their School Direc-
tors for six-year terms. The school district is a legal political sub-
division of the state and, in effect, is a special governmental unit
designed to serve the educational needs of a particular area.' 5
An institutional district is a special district since it is a body cor-
porate created to take care of dependents not provided for in some
manner by law. These dependents include the superannuated widows,
orphans, physically handicapped and mental patients. Each county
in Pennsylvania has one political subdivision designated the county
institutional district. This governmental unit is under the control of
the Board of County Commissioners and, therefore, is considered a
county governmental unit. The County Commissioners are responsi-
ble for the preparation of the annual budget, the auditing of all
the institutional funds by either the Auditors or Controller, and
the filing of an annual report with the Secretary of Internal Affairs.
To maintain the cost of carrying out their functions, the county insti-
tutional districts levy taxes on the assessed valuation of real property
within the county.' 6
However, the majority of the overlapping districts, e.g., highway 7
and election' 8 districts, have very narrow governing powers as com-
pared to municipal authorities. The highway districts are governed
13 Id. at 59.
14 Act of August 8, 1963, as amended, P.L. 546; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2-202
(1964), as amended.
15 HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 59-60.
16 Id. at 53.
17 Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, art. XX, § 2002; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 514
(1962).
18 Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, art. V. §§ 501-502; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§§ 2701-2702.
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by the Department of Highways, which has the power and duty to
divide the State into suitable highway districts or divisions and place
in charge of each district or division such employee of the Depart-
ment as the Secretary of Highways deems advisable.1 9 The Depart-
ment of Highways has the power and duty (a) to have general super-
vision over all township highways and bridges, (b) to approve plans
and specifications and estimates for the erection and repair of town-
ship highways and bridges, (c) to furnish, from time to time, bul-
letins of instruction to the boards of township supervisors throughout
the state for the building and repair of township roads and bridges,
(d) to prescribe the method of keeping township accounts and
records of moneys received and expended for highways, machinery,
bridges, tools and implements, and for miscellaneous purposes.20 It
is well to note that highway districts are not vested as bodies cor-
porate as are school districts.21 Highway districts are merely geo-
graphical subdivisions or agencies of the state without authority to
tax, borrow or condemn property by eminent domain.
The same holds true for election districts. Each borough and town-
ship, not divided into wards, and each ward of every city, borough
and township now existing or hereafter created, constitutes a sepa-
rate election district, unless divided into two or more election
districts2 Again, an election district is not a body corporate as com-
pared with an institutional or poor district.23
Under the Pennsylvania "Statutory Construction Act,' 2 4 the term
"district" is not defined, but a "municipality authority" or "municipal
authority" is defined as a body corporate and politic created pursuant
to the Municipality Authorities Act.2 5 Therefore, all municipal au-
thorities and some districts, such as school and institutional districts,
may be classified as public quasi-corporations by the legislature, but
the majority of districts are not so classified.
This article will consider why the overlapping district and munici-
19 Supra note 17.
20 Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, art. XX, § 2006; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 516
(1962).
21 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, art. II, § 211; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2-211
(1962).
22 Supra note 18.
23 Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2017, art. III § 301; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2251
(1959); cf. supra note 18.
24 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, art. VIII, § 101; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 601
(70.1) (1952), as amended, June 14, 1957, P.L. 323, No. 171, § 8.
25 Supra note 9.
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pal authority came into existence and which type should be preferred
in the expanding area of urban redevelopment.
MUNICIPAL DEBT LIMITATIONS
Municipal debt limitation provisions are found incorporated in
state constitutions, statutes and municipal charters. They fall into
three main categories: (1) provisions forbidding indebtedness in ex-
cess of a fixed percentage of the assessed value of the taxable prop-
erty therein or other overlapping taxing district; (2) provisions limit-
ing indebtedness not to exceed income and revenue provided for in
any one year; and (3) provisions combining both of the above limita-
tions 6 Such provisions are found in the constitutions of most of the
states2 7 Municipal indebtedness arising from the building or pur-
chasing of specified public utilities is exempted from the constitu-
tional debt limitations.28 Other constitutions merely exempt public
utilities generally. 9 This immediately raises problems as to what
constitutes a public utility. 0 Some constitutions exclude indebtedness
incurred for necessary expenses.31 Most courts have held that the
issuance of municipal refunding bonds is permissible even though
the constitutional debt limitation has been exceeded. 2 Today, con-
stitutional provisions in some states expressly authorize the issuance
of municipal refunding bonds, even though the debt limitation has
been reached.38
One would imagine that the constitutional and statutory limita-
tions would be sufficient protection against municipal extravagance
26 STASON AND KAUPER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 518.
27 ALA. CONST. art. 12, § 225; ARiz. CONST. art. 9, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 18;
COLO. CONS?. art. XI, § 8; GA. CONST. art. VII, § VII; HAwAIu CONS?. art. VI, § 3;
IDAHO CONS?. art. 8, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 13, § 1; IOWA
CONST. art. XI, § 3; Ky. CoNsT. § 158; LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(f); Ma. CONST.
art. IX, § 15; MD. CONST. art. XI-E § 5; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; Mo. CONST.
art. VI, § 26(b); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 5, 6; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 13; N.Y.
CONST. art. VIII, § 10; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. XII, § 183; OKLA.
CONST. art. 10, § 26; ORE. CONST. art. XI, § 11; PA. CONS?. art. 9, § 8; S.C. CONST.
art. 10, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; Tax. CONS?. art. 3, § 52; UTAH CONST. art.
XIV, § 4; VA. CoNs?. art. VIII, § 127; WASH. CONSr. art. 8, § 6; W. VA. CONST.
art. X, § 8; WIS. CONS?. art. XI, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 16, § 5.
28 ALA. CONST. art. 12, § 225; ARK. CONST. amend. 13, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. 8,
§ 3, as amended by H.J.R. No. 5 (S.L. 1963, p. 1149) ratified Nov. 3, 1964; PA.
CONST. art. 9, § 15.
29 E.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 27.
30 See Coleman v. Frame, 26 Okla. 193, 109 Pac. 928 (1910).
31 E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. 8, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. 7, § 7.
32 See, e.g., Veatch v. City of Moscow, 18 Idaho 313, 109 Pac. 722 (1910).
33 ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 225; Ky. CONST. § 158; LA. CoNST. art. 14, § 14(g);
ME. CONST. art. IX, § 15; Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 28; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 15; S.C.
CONST. art. 10, § 5.
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and against the creation of excessive bonded indebtedness.3 4 How-
ever, many municipalities had reached their limits at the time of
World War II and their borrowing power was exhausted; yet they
were in need of capital expansion and renewal programs to replace
worn-out capital facilities.85
In Pennsylvania, for example, when a municipality, desires to incur
a debt or borrow money, there must be some antecedent legislative
authority, either direct or implied from the necessity of performing
a duty which must involve the spending of money.36
This authority to incur a debt or borrow money by municipalities
(the word does not include a city of the First Class, a county of the
First Class or a city institution district) ,s the procedures to be fol-
lowed, and the restrictions upon their authority are itemized in the
"Municipal Borrowing Law.'2 8
The Pennsylvania Constitution 9 and a statute ° limit the debt
which may be incurred by a municipality, allowing two per centum
of the debt to be incurred by the municipal authorities without the
assent of the voters, but requiring the assent of the voters before the
balance of five per centum may be incurred. This normally means the
net debt of any municipality may equal seven per centum.4 1
However, municipal indebtedness for the construction or acquisi-
tion of waterworks, subways, underground railways or street rail-
ways, or the appurtenances thereof, is not considered a debt of the
municipality but is given special treatment. Thus, municipalities and
counties may incur indebtedness in excess of seven per centum, and
not exceeding ten per centum of the assessed valuation of the taxable
property therein, if the increase in indebtedness for the construction
or acquisition of public works shall have been assented to by three-
fifths of the electors voting at a public election.42
84 Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness, 30 MtcH. L.
REV. 833 (1932); Bowers, Jr., Limitations on Municipal Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L. REv.
37 (1951).
35 HANcoCK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 61.
86 Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364, 143 Ad. 10 (1928).
81 Act of June 25, 1941, P.L. 159, art. 1, § 102; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6102
(1957).
38 Act of June 25, 1941, P.L. 159, art. 1, § 101; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6101-703
(1957).
80 PA. CONST. art. 9, § 8.
40 Act of June 25, 1941, P.L 159, art. II, § 201; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6201-03
(1964).
41 Ibid.
42 PA. CONST. art. 9, § 15; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6203.
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There is a proposed amendment to increase the debt limit of a
municipality or incorporated district, except the City of Philadelphia,
to fifteen per centurn of the assessed value of the taxable property
therein, with the consent of the voters at a public election; and any
municipality or district may incur any debt or increase its indebted-
ness to an amount not exceeding five per centum. of the taxable
property therein without the consent of the voters at a public elec-
tion.48
This proposed amendment is in keeping with the purpose of the
constitutional restrictions on municipal debts, which is to check the
rash expenditure on credit and borrowing and to prevent loading the
future with results of present inconsiderate extravagance.44
The constitutional provisions limiting the power of municipalities
to incur indebtedness supersede any prior statutory provisions, even
though the legislature has not specifically repealed them. 45 Should
the proposed amendment be passed, it will prevail.
In determining the "assessed value" of taxable property, the con-
stitutional language means the valuation fixed by the city authorities
for city taxation, not that made by county officers for county pur-
poses.46 This determination of value is conclusive, and no objection
can be made in proceedings relating to indebtedness on the ground
that non-taxable property was included by the taxing authorities.4Y
The reference to the term "debt" as it appears in the constitution
is not used in any technical way, but rather in its broad sense.48 A
debt is created when an obligation is undertaken to pay in the future
for consideration in the present and includes a present and actual
creditor as an incident to the transaction.49 The incurring of any
liability to pay out money, in the present or future, is a debt for
purposes of the limitations."0 In a word, a debt is created if there is
an existing obligation presently enforceable against the property or
funds of the municipality or an obligation presently existing but
enforceable in the future.51 Unliquidated damages owed to land-
43 Amendment proposed by Joint Resolution No. 4, 1963, S.B. No. 37.
44 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41, 46 At. 1035 (1900).
45 In re Borough of Millvale, 162 Pa. 374, 29 Ad. 651 (1894).
46 DuPont v. City of Pittsburgh, 69 F. 13 (1895).
47 Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. 72, 2 Ad. 77 (1886).
48 Appeal of the City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
49 Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 334 Pa. 513, 6 A.2d 78 (1939).
50 Appeal of Luburg, 17 Ad. 245 (Pa. 1889).
1 Appeal of the City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
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owners from a public improvement caused by a municipality under
its right of eminent domain or damages from injuries to lands abut-
ting those on which a public improvement is erected constitute a debt
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. 2
The indebtedness limitations apply only to limit the power of a
municipality to incur new debt and prescribes the details required to
be observed in so doing. The provisions are not violated by a transfer
of debts from one municipality or district to another municipality or
district in connection with an annexation or consolidation proceed-
ing.58 On the other hand, the amount of a municipality's debt which
has been assumed by another municipality or district cannot be de-
ducted from the municipality's gross indebtedness to determine its
borrowing capacity. 4
Any contract made by a municipality pertaining to its ordinary
expenses, such as the repaving of a street, which is, together with
other like expenses, within the limit of its current revenues or the
municipality has the means of acquiring the revenues otherwise than
by loans, does not constitute an increasing of indebtedness within
the meaning of the constitutional provision limiting the power of
municipal corporations to contract debts. 5
Judgments obtained against a municipality are properly included
in computing the amount of the municipality's indebtedness which
cannot be made from current revenues. However, unliquidated
claims, as to which a municipality denies liability, should not be
included in computing the amount of the municipality's indebted-
ness.56
Obligations accruing by Act of God or possible laws to be passed
in the future are not considered debts within the constitutional
definition. 7
When a municipality raises money by a bond issue for the construc-
tion of a public building, the subsequent making of a contract for
the erection of the public building is not considered a further in-
crease of municipal indebtedness in computing the amount of the
52 Keller v. City of Scranton, 200 Pa. 130, 49 At. 781 (1901).
53 Managers for Relief and Employment of Poor of Germantown Tp. v. Witkin, 329
Pa. 410, 196 Ad. 837 (1938).
54 McGuire v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 287, 91 Ad. 622 (1914).
55 Reuting v. City of Titusville, 175 Pa. 512, 34 At. 916 (1896).
56 Schuldice v. City of Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 95 At. 938 (1915).
57 Appeal of the City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
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municipal indebtedness. This is to say, the amount of the liability
under the contract and the amount of the bond issue are considered
one.
8
Bond issues to fund a circulating debt or refund a funded existing
indebtedness are not new indebtedness within the meaning of the
constitutional prohibition. 9 It may be possible to obtain funds at a
lower rate of interest to pay off the existing debt. The fact that the
new indebtedness combined with the old indebtedness may exceed
the constitutional limit is immaterial so long as the new indebtedness
after the refunding is within the prescribed limit.60
As the above situations indicate, the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania has not been able to check municipal extravagance and to
guard against the creation of excessive municipal bonded indebted-
ness by constitutional or statutory methods.
MUNICIPAL OVERLAPPING DISTRICTS
A municipal overlapping district may be defined as a separate and
independent political subdivision, the boundaries of which are identi-
cal with or overlap the territory of the municipality itself and
perform the function which a municipality normally performs."' The
general rule is that in determining the constitutional debt limit of a
municipality the indebtedness of an overlapping district is not to be
taken into consideration."2 As the court pointed out in Kelley v.
Brunswick School District,6 3 an injunction proceeding, where some
independent board or commission, which, though technically a sepa-.
rate corporation, is only an agency of the town or city, incurs or seeks
to incur a debt, the courts ought to look behind the fiction to see what
the real fact is. But the courts may not, absent express constitutional
limitations, entirely deny the power of the legislature to create
wholly or partly, in town or city limits, different public corporate
bodies, and to make clear that their debts are to be regarded as those
of independent corporations.
In arriving at the general rule, some of the courts, in interpreting
the statutes establishing school districts or units as corporate bodies
U8 Stratton v. Allegheny County, 245 Pa. 519, 91 Ati. 894 (1914).
59 Hirt v. City of Erie, 200 Pa. 223, 49 At. 796 (1901).
O0 Roye v. Borough of Columbia, 192 Pa. 146, 43 Atl. 597 (1899).
61 Annot., 171 A.L.R. 729 (1947).
62 See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 818 (1935).
63 134 Me. 414, 187 Ad. 703 (1936).
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with separate powers and liabilities, have held that the statute
requires a school district to be considered as a separate and distinct
political unit for the purpose of determining the constitutional debt
limit of the school district or municipality, the boundaries of which
are coterminous or overlapping with the school district. 4
The same conclusion has been reached without reference to an
express statute but rather on the basis of general statutory interpreta-
tion or judicial reasoning alone.65
A minority of the courts, apparently influenced by special statutory
language involved, have reached a contrary view.6
While a separate school district may be created within the boun-
daries coterminous with a municipality, it was held in the classic case
of Cerajewski v. McVey,1 7 that the constitutional prohibition may not
be evaded by creating a separate vocational high school district
within the boundaries of an existing school district for the purpose
of borrowing money with which to build a technical vocational high
school which the existing school district had the full power to build
at any time.
Cities, villages, towns and townships have been held to be separate
governmental units independent from the territorial subdivisions of
counties within the meaning of the constitutional debt limitations. 8
In the area of urban renewal or redevelopment, where has the
district type of device been used to perform designated public func-
tions which are coextensive or overlapping with that of the munici-
pality? In Kennebec Water Dist. v, City of Waterville, 9 the court
concluded that the debts created by the water district were not the
64 Lyon v. Strock, 274 Pa. 541, 118 AUt. 432 (1922).
65 Hamrick v. Special Tax School Dist. No. 1, 130 Fla. 453, 178 So. 406 (1938);
Sanders v. County Ct., 115 W. Va. 187, 174 S.E. 878 (1934); Lippert v. School Dist.,
187 Wis. 154, 203 N.W. 940 (1925).
66 McCabe v. Gross, 274 N.Y. 39, 8 N.E.2d 269 (1937) (rehearing denied 274
N.Y. 611, 10 N.E.2d 576 (1937); Territory ex rel. McGuire v. Logan County High
School, 13 Okla. 605, 76 Pac. 165 (1904).
67 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650 (1947); Accord, Rankin v. Love, 232 P.2d 998
(Mont. 1951). But cf. Goren v. Buena High School Dist., 91 Ariz. 348, 372 P.2d 692
(1962); Morgan v. Board of Sup'rs, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P.2d 236 (1948); Pinion v.
Walker County School Dist., 45 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. 1947); McLain v. Phelps, 409 111.
393, 100 N.E.2d 753 (1951); Huffman v. School Board, 41 N.W.2d 455 (Minn.
1950); House v. School Dist. No. 4 of Park County, 184 P.2d 285 (Mont. 1947);
Chisens v. Central High School Dist. No. 2, 136 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1954); Grey v.
Vaigneur, 135 S.E.2d 229 (S.C. 1964); Tindall v. Byars, 59 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 1950).
68 Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 141 Ad. 891 (1928); Irwin v, Lowe, 89
Ind. 540 (1883).
69 96 Me. 234, 52 Ad. 774 (1902).
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debts of the city within the meaning of the constitutional debt limit.
The court stated that:
In the case at bar the power to take private property for public
use is granted to the water district, and not to the city of Waterville.
Compensation for the property so taken is to be paid by the water
district. The title to the property which may be acquired by volun-
tary or enforced purchase is to vest in the district. To provide funds
for the payment of property purchased or taken, the district is
authorized to issue bonds, which, by the express terms of its charter,
shall be legal obligations of the water district.70
It is well settled by a long line of decisions that the legislature is
empowered to carve out a district from a territory of the state for the
accomplishment of some public purpose. The creation by the legisla-
ture of a special-purpose district for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining a public airport is a lawful exercise by the legislature
of its plenary power to create special-purpose districts, and the only
constitutional limitation controlling the debt limit of such an airport
district was the limitation found in the constitution.71 A statute au-
thorizing the creation of what was known as an airport authority
district was not unconstitutional on the grounds that the general
bonds issued by the board would, when added to the existing indebt-
edness of a municipality, exceed the constitutional debt limitations of
both the municipality and the county, notwithstanding contention
that creation of the airport authority district was simply a device to
avoid the constitutional debt limitation imposed upon munici-
palities.72
It has been held that a bond issue of a municipal recreation district,
a body corporate and politic constituted of the inhabitants of and
territory within the municipality, for the purpose of financing the
construction of an auditorium, would not be a debt of the munici-
pality and hence would not be in any way affected by the con-
stitutional debt limit applicable to the municipality.73 If a statute
authorizes the establishment of a public park district within the terri-
torial limits, which is not, however, a new or distinct municipal
corporation, the indebtedness of the public park district would not
be included in computing the debt limitation of the municipality.7"
70 Id. at 255, 52 Ad. at 783.
71 Berry v. Milliken, 109 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 1959).
72 Bailey v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist., 166 N.E.2d 520 (Ind.
1960).
73 Carlisle v. Bangor Recreation Center, 103 A.2d 339 (Me. 1954).
74 Orvis v. Park Commissioners, 88 Iowa 674, 56 N.W. 294 (1893).
1966]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
The statutes authorizing the establishment of a sanitary district,
the area of which was coextensive with that of a municipality, to sell
bonds for the construction of additional sewers, pumps, and build-
ings, did not create a debt within the constitutional provisions re-
stricting municipal debt limitations.75 These statutes delegating
power to the municipal board to establish municipal sanitary dis-
tricts, the boundaries of which are coterminous with the municipality,
are permissive delegations of legislative police power and are not
unconstitutional as affording a sanitary district the opportunity to
evade the constitutional debt limitation."6 A drainage district has
been accepted as valid and the fact that a drainage district was within
a municipality which was already indebted to the constitutional limit
did not prevent the levy of special assessments by the drainage
district.77
A statute creating an incorporated pier district was not invalid
upon the basis that the proposed bond issue by the pier district would
operate to increase the indebtedness of one of the municipalities lying
within the boundaries of the pier district beyond the constitutional
debt limitation, even though the legislature gave this pier district the
power to tax.78
In the area of slum clearance, renewal and redevelopment of urban
housing, many statutes have been passed providing for the creation
of housing authorities. 70 This was necessary because municipal
zoning ordinances and building codes were inadequate to cope with
the overall problem. The authority device thus became very popular
in this area because it was not subject to the constitutional debt
limitation provision.' As the court stated in Lloyd v. Twin Falls
Housing Authority:
The legislative act [relating to housing authorities] does not
provide for electors or elections. It cannot make provision for the
collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest of its in-
debtedness as it falls due, for the law does not authorize or permit
it to levy or collect a tax. It is not a county, city, town, township,
75 Department of Public Sanitation v. Sloan, 97 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1951).
76 Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Town Board of Aswaubenon, 266 Wis. 191, 63 N.W.2d
122 (1954); Wilson v. Sanitary Dist., 133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1890).
77 People ex rel. Wysong v. Honeywell, 258 111. 319, 101 N.E. 571 (1913).
78 Hamilton v. Portland State Pier Site Dist., 120 Me. 15, 112 Ad. 836 (1921). See
also Straw v. Harris, 54 Ore. 424, 103 Pac. 777 (1909).
79 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing
Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939).
80 Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938).
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board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, within the meaning of . .. the constitution, and the pro-
hibition expressed in that section does not apply to it.81
PENNSYLVANIA URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
The "Pennsylvania Urban Redevelopment Law"' 2 spells out in
great detail the legislative findings on urban renewal:
(a) That there exists in urban communities in this Common-
wealth areas which have become blighted because of the unsafe, un-
sanitary, inadequate or over-crowded conditions of the dwellings
therein ...
(b) That such conditions .. .will continue to result in making
such areas economic or social liabilities, harmful to the social and
economic well-being of the entire communities in which they
exist ...
(c) That the foregoing conditions are beyond remedy or control
by regulatory processes in certain blighted areas .. .and cannot
be effectively dealt with by private enterprise under existing laws
... replanning and redevelopment is difficult and impossible
without the effective public power of eminent domain.
(c.1) That certain blighted areas . ..may require total acqui-
sition, clearance and disposition .. . that the conditions and evils
hereinbefore enumerated may be eliminated or remedied.
(d) That the replanning and redevelopment of such areas ...
will promote the public health, safety, convenience and welfare.83
To implement the foregoing findings and policy, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly established redevelopment authorities which exist
and operate for the public purposes of eliminating blighted areas
through economically and socially sound redevelopment of these
areas, in conformity with the comprehensive general plans of their
respective municipalities for residential, recreational, commercial,
industrial or other purposes, and otherwise encouraging the provid-
ing of healthful homes, a decent living environment and adequate
places for employment of the people of the state."
The Act provides for the formation of these redevelopment au-
thorities and created them as separate corporate bodies which are in
81 113 P.2d 1102 (Idaho 1941).
82 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1701 et seq.
(1964).
83 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 2; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1702 (1964).
84 Ibid.
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no way to be deemed as an instrumentality of the city or county in
which they are to operate. No authority shall transact any business
or become operative unless there is a finding by the proper governing
body of the city or county involved that there is a need for an au-
thority and that the finding by ordinance be filed with the Depart-
ment of State and a duplicate thereof with the State Planning
Board.85 The five members of the authority are to be appointed by the
Mayor or Board of County Commissioners of the city or countyY06 It
is well to note that only the cities and counties may create a redevel-
opment authority and that boroughs, towns and townships are not
authorized to establish their own redevelopment authority.
An authority is to exercise the public powers of the Common-
wealth, being an agency thereof, which powers shall include all
powers necessary or appropriate to carry out and effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act. 7 Among the powers granted are the powers to
"assemble, purchase, obtain options upon, acquire by gift, grant,
bequest, devise or otherwise any real or personal property . . .,;88
"to acquire by eminent domain any real property.., for the public
purposes set forth in this act ... ";s "to own, hold, clear, improve
and manage real property";90 "to sell, lease or otherwise transfer
any real property located outside of a redevelopment area and...
any real property in a redevelopment area . . *";91 and to "make and
execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to
the exercise of the powers of the Authority .... 2
The Act provides that the title to the property acquired by an
authority through eminent domain proceedings shall be an absolute
or fee simple title, unless a lesser title shall be designated in the
eminent domain proceedings.93 Under the Act, the authority has the
power to issue bonds for any of its corporate purposes. Further,
85 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 4; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1705 (1964).
86 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 5; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1705 (1964).
87 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709 (1964).
88 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9(h); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709(h)
(1964).
89 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9(i); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709(i)
(1964).
90 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9(j); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709(j)
(1964).
91 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9(k); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709(k)
(1964).
92 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 9(t); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1709(t)
(1964).
93 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, § 12; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1712 (1964).
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under the "Pennsylvania Redevelopment Cooperation Law,"' 4 the
Act provides that either the city council or the county commissioners
may make advances to a redevelopment authority to assist an au-
thority to carry out its public purposes.'5 As a result of the powers
granted under the Act, many cities, e.g., the City of Pittsburgh, in
1946 created the "Urban Redevelopment Authority." Needless to
say, this agency, more than any other, has given Pittsburgh an inter-
national image in the area of urban redevelopment. So much so, that
Pittsburgh is frequently referred to as the "Renaissance City."
The constitutionality of the "Urban Redevelopment Law" was
challenged in Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of
Philadelphia.6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the con-
stitutionality of this Act. At the outset, the court was faced with the
issue of whether the elimination and rehabilitation of slum and
blighted areas is a taking for a "public use" within the constitutional
provision respecting eminent domain. The court stated:
In the case of the Urban Redevelopment Law, therefore, the justifi-
cation of the grant of the power of eminent domain is even dearer
than in the case of the Housing Authorities Law, there being in the
present act only the one major purpose of the elimination and re-
habilitation of the blighted sections of our municipalities, and that
purpose certainly falls within any conception of 'public use' for
nothing can be more beneficial to the community as a whole than
the clearance and reconstruction of those sub-standard areas which
are characterized by the evils described in the Urban Redevelopment
Law. It has long been clear that those evils cannot be eradicated
merely by such measures, however admirable in themselves, as
tenement-house laws, zoning laws and building codes and regula-
tions; these deal only with future construction, not with presently
existing conditions. Nor, as experience has shown, is private enter-
prise adequate for the purpose. The legislature has therefore con-
cluded-and the wisdom of its conclusion is for it alone-that
public aid must accompany private initiative if the desired results
are to be obtained.9 7
The appellant then claimed that the final result of the operation
was to take property from one individual and transfer it to another.
It is well settled that property cannot be taken by the government
without the owner's consent for the mere purpose of devoting it to
the private use of another, even though there be involved in the
94 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 982, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1741 et seq.
(1964).
95 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 982, § 6; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 35, § 1746 (1964).
96 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
97 Id. at 329, 54 A.2d at 282.
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transaction an incidental benefit to the public. s The court carefully
pointed out that the Urban Redevelopment Law is riot one requiring
a continuing ownership of the property, as is the case of the Housing
Authorities Law,99 to carry out the full purpose of that law. Rather,
this Act is directed solely to the purpose of clearance, reconstruction
and rehabilitation of the blighted area, and, after that is accom-
plished, the need for public ownership has terminated. It is then
proper that the land be retransferred to private ownership, subject
only to such restrictions and controls as are necessary to effectuate
the aforementioned purposes. It is not the object of the statute to
transfer property from one individual to another and, if the public
good is enhanced, it is immaterial that a private interest also may be
benefited.
The appellant also raised the unlawful delegation of authority
and insufficient standards arguments. The court disposed of these
arguments by stating:
The planning necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act must
necessarily vary from place to place within the same city or county
and from city to city and county to county. All that the legislature
could do, therefore, was to prescribe general rules and reasonably
definite standards, leaving to the local authorities the preparation
of the plans and specifications best adapted to accomplish in each
instance the desired result, a function which obviously can be per-
formed only by administrative bodies. While the legislature cannot
delegate the power to make a law, it may, where necessary, confer
authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the
law; it may establish primary standards and impose upon others the
duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in accordance with
the general provisions of the act.100
In holding the Urban Redevelopment Law constitutional, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court paved the way for tremendous rede-
velopment to take effect in Pennsylvania. This decision leaves no
doubt that the redevelopment authorities may take private property
by condemnation and resell it to private individuals for development
according to a redevelopment plan to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.
In a subsequent case, Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh,'01 the plaintiff
98 Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 At. 904
(1913).
99 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 955, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1541 et seq.
(1964).
100 357 Pa. at 342, 54 A.2d at 283-84.
101 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).
[Vol. 3
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
contended that redevelopment under the Urban Redevelopment Law
was limited primarily to the relieving of undesirable living conditions
and that any land which is commercial may not be redeveloped
unless it is ancillary and incidental to the redevelopment of a resi-
dential area. However, the court did not accept this argument and
stated:
If the Urban Redevelopment Law were to be held to apply only
to the clearing of blighted residential areas and the reconstruction
of dwelling houses thereon there would have been no reason for
its enactment since it would have added nothing to the Housing
Authorities Law already in force. On the contrary, the Urban Re-
development Law was obviously intended to give wide scope to
municipalities in redesigning and rebuilding such areas within their
limits as, by reason of the passage of years and the enormous
changes in traffic conditions and types of building construction, no
longer meet the economic and social needs of modern city life and
progress. Such needs exist, even if from a different angle, as well in
the case of industrial and commercial as of residential areas. 102
In Oliver v. City of Clairton,°3 the court was concerned with
the question whether or not, under the Urban Redevelopment Law,
vacant or unimproved land could be taken by the Redevelopment
Authority's right of condemnation. The court stated:
The Urban Redevelopment Law does not limit the certification of
blighted areas to improved property; on the contrary, section 3(n)
defines the term "Redevelopment Area" as "Any area, whether
improved or unimproved, which a planning commission may find
to be blighted because of the existence of the conditions enumerated
in section two of this act so as to require redevelopment under the
provisions of this act." And section 3(m) defines the term "Rede-
velopment" as the acquisition, replanning, etc. of an area, "includ-
ing the provision of streets, parks, recreational areas and other
open spaces."'104
Urban redevelopment authorities, therefore, may exercise their
right of eminent domain pursuant to a redevelopment proposal even
though the area may be preponderantly open, vacant or unimproved.
As the aforementioned decisions indicate, the constitutionality of
the Urban Redevelopment Law in Pennsylvania has been resolved
and redevelopment authorities have been created in cities and coun-
ties throughout the state. They operate in conjunction with the
102 Id. at 37, 70 A.2d at 615.
103 374 Pa. 333, 98 A.2d 47 (1953).
104 Id. at 342, 98 A.2d at 52.
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Housing and Home Finance Agency,105 a federal agency, in order to
obtain maximum federal funds to carry out their redevelopment
projects. In addition to the redevelopment authorities, many other
types of authorities now exist throughout the state, such as: port
authorities, 106 auditorium authorities,107 parking authorities, 08 county
authorities, 09 industrial development authorities'" and housing
authorities."' Therefore, urban redevelopment authorities, like
school districts, have become permanent institutions and will be
with us for a long time.
CONCLUSION
In the area of redevelopment, whatever view one advocates, it will
prove to be provocative, emotional and controversial. Since urban
redevelopment, like education, has become a perennial problem, the
form of legal device to be used becomes extremely important in the
light of the constitutional debt limitation provisions. The two
devices used are districts and authorities, with the latter most fre-
quently employed. Districts come within the constitutional prohibi-
tions, but authorities do not. In the long run, however, perhaps the
district device may emerge as the best form to be used to solve the
relocation and redevelopment problems. At least, it merits a closer
investigation than has been given to it heretofore. The district device
provides for residents of the community affected to serve on the
board and for local elections to be held to fill that office. The device
permits the levy and collection of taxes by the district, and the in-
corporated district falls within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
visions limiting indebtedness incurred by political subdivisions to
seven (7) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable prop-
erty therein, and the provisions that no municipality or district shall
incur any new debt or increase its indebtedness to an amount ex-
ceeding two (2) per centum upon such assessed valuation of prop-
erty, without the consent of the electors thereof obtained at a public
105 63 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (1949).
106 Act of April 6, 1956, P.L. 1414, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 551 et seq.
(1964).
107 Act of July 29, 1953, P.L. 1034, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23841 et seq.
(1957).
108 Act of June 5, 1947, P.L. 458, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 341 et seq. (1957).
109 Act of December 27, 1933, Sp. Sess., P.L. 114, art. 1, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 12601 et seq. (1956).
110 Act of May 15, 1956, P.L. 1609, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 301 et seq.
(1960).




election in a manner provided by law. Therefore, the district device
is in keeping with the constitutional provision to check municipal
extravagance and to guard against the creation of excessive muni-
cipal bonded indebtedness by constitutional and statutory methods.
Historically, the citizens have rebelled against "taxation without
representation." With the authority as a subterfuge, the citizen has
no control over who will represent him and how his money will be
spent through the nefarious schemes that have since been perfected.
In the end, it is the taxpayer who ultimately bears the burdens which
have been created by the authority. Would it not be more desirable,
if more money is required to finance the necessary urban redevelop-
ment undertakings, to raise the constitutional debt limitation provi-
sions to more realistic figures, as has been advanced in Pennsylvania
by proposed amendments to the constitution? This would be in
keeping with both the letter and the spirit of the law. If school and
institutional districts function satisfactorily a fortiori, wouldn't urban
redevelopment districts function equally as well? This approach
would be true democracy in action.
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